I quite like books. Traditionally I have read fiction – but when I became an undergraduate, all of my reading energy was devoted to the books prescribed by my course. Once I graduated, I began to get back into reading again. This time, however, I have not been reading fiction. Spurned mainly by my research for my own novel, the last three books I have gone through were all non-fiction.
Today I thought I would direct your attention to one of these non-fiction books that stood out, both in its subject material and how it is written. The book in question is Hitler’s Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre by Paul Adair.
First and foremost, I love the cover art. I know it is a rather basic thing to say about a book, but when it comes to titles like this one, it is not really expected to be at the forefront. Intricate or attractive jacket designs are usually reserved for fiction.
I should begin by summarising what the book is about. When I mention Hitler’s Greatest Defeat I do not refer to the later stages of the Battle of Stalingrad, or even the Battle of Berlin. The event Adair refers to, and writes about in great detail, was known as Operation Bagration.
I have always been surprised about how little this massive Soviet offensive is known. Were I to ask what the largest defeats the Nazi regime suffered from June 1944 onwards, you would be well within your rights to say the Allied landings at Normandy. It is likely that Bagration is simply overshadowed by that looming invasion. While the Allies were landing en masse in France, however, the war still raged on the Eastern Front. By June 1944 the front had finally moved out of the Russian Motherland and into the fringes of Belarus, its immediate neighbour. From mid-June until early August, the Wehrmacht would suffer the heaviest losses in the entire war – they lost in the region of 30-40 Divisions. To put it in perspective, an Infantry Division contains anywhere between 10,000 to 20,000 men (but this number wildly varied throughout the war, especially with dwindling manpower towards the end of it). Granted, the Soviets suffered heavy losses as well – but they were capable of replacing these. Not to mention their massive numerical advantage over the Wehrmacht.
I thought the book was great. It gave an in-depth insight into how perhaps the most important (but also the most overlooked) battle of the war was fought. On top of that, Adair does it in logical stages. He goes through the organisation of each army – The main divisions, their commanders, all the way up to the very top. Adair makes it crystal clear the many reasons why the Wehrmacht were defeated, and the USSR was victorious. Firstly, you have Hitler’s obsessive need to micro-manage every aspect of the battle – using outdated tactics from his personal experience in the First World War, instead of relying on the proved brilliance of some of his own generals. This point I admit is a rather common explanation for the ultimate defeat of Germany in the war, Adair does not fail to mention the other influences of the defeat, though. Then, you have the effects of Soviet Partisans operating behind enemy lines as well as Stalin’s own emerging stars (forgive the pun) and his acceptance of their skill as leaders of armies. The Soviet leader did like to micro-manage like Hitler, but the difference is that he would often trust in the judgement of his generals. Occasionally he would pit his commanders against each other in achieving a single goal (especially later during the Berlin offensive), and he liked to instigate rivalries to make sure there was no complacency. There is also a good section of the book devoted to maskirovka, essentially deception – something the Soviets had become masters of. I will go into a little more detail on this phenomenon later.
After the layout of both armies, Adair moves into the buildup to the battle with German Generals realising something big was coming – but not where or when. There are occasional first hand accounts, making each learned fact more compelling. For instance, there was an exchange between a German foot soldier and someone else higher up the chain – a company commander, I believe – the footsoldier spotted massing Red army soldiers, reported it, and received the response that it was only “a decoy” with orders not to act on the sighting. Safe to say it was not a decoy.
This was the result of the Red Army’s of masterfully executed deceptions on their enemy – the aforementioned maskirovka. One of my favourite anecdotes was the battalion of men that was marched in full view of the enemy during the day, frantically marched back under the cover of night, and then marched forth again in the view of the Germans the next day – this fooled the Wehrmacht into thinking the Soviets were funneling more men into another region than they actually were. In fact, the Germans had fully believed that the Russians would attack further south through Ukraine – the shorter route to Germany. This, of course, was false.
Something from this book that is (to an extent) surprisingly absent from others is detailed maps indicating not just the regions of key battles, but the positions of the various divisions and their trajectories through the region. For instance, the movement of the German 9th Army as it retreated back, or the Soviet 3rd Belorussian Front making its charge to Minsk. I do not doubt other books have maps like this, but the accessibility of Adair’s, combined with their actual positioning in the right place in the book was invaluable. Say, if the maps were all in the front of the book, it would be awkward flicking back, figuring out which one was being referred to. Scattering them throughout makes them much more easy to reference alongside Adair’s explanations and analyses. And of course, you get the standard historical photographs of the key commanders mostly, but others as well. Things like that really help with visualising the events unfold.
The book also covers the rest of the battle, up to pretty much the point where the Soviets have full control of Belarus. One of my favourite parts was the description of the panicked German retreat, caused by a general lack of leadership and made even more dangerous by the very few river bridges still standing (Belarus is a very swampy place, especially in the south and east).
Of course, Hitler forbade retreating, designating a few towns as Feste Plätze – fortress towns. These were the backbone of the static defense Hitler envisaged. However, a static defense against such Soviet superiority was never going to work. Adair makes it clear that the Germans, in truth, had no idea what they were up against. Not only did they completely underestimate the Soviet forces, they were duped into thinking the offensive would come elsewhere. As such, many divisions were in the completely wrong place at the time of the Red Army’s attack.
The main issue with the book is that it is no longer in print. It was first published before I was born and sold only a handful of copies. Perhaps that is to be expected from specialised academic work like this. I got mine second-hand off Amazon for the cheap price of two pence. Of course, I had to pay postage so in reality it was £2.80 – a price unbelievably worth it for what you get. For anyone remotely interested in the Eastern Front, this book and the knowledge of the battle it contains is invaluable.
Bagration was the biggest defeat of the war for the Germans, and perhaps, the moment that sealed the Third Reich’s ultimate demise. The effective destruction of an entire Army Group was something they simply could not replace. Yet it is amazing to see so little physically on it. Perhaps this is because the main focus of June 1944 is the Normandy Landings. Or that the public’s standout moments of the Eastern Front are the Battles of Berlin and Stalingrad. But to forget this pivotal offensive, the one that essentially signed the Nazi Regime’s death warrant, is surprising. Perhaps it is better known in Russia and other Baltic states where I assume their learning of the history will be more focused on the Eastern front – while in countries like Britain and America, a more western viewpoint is taken. Either way, Bagration is an offensive not to be ignored, and neither is Paul Adair’s work on the subject.
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